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WALLER, WARNOCK AND ROE V. WADE:
VARIATIONS ON THE STATUS OF THE
ORPHAN EMBRYO
INTRODUCTION
With the birth in Australia of the first child as a result of embryo cry-
opreservation' and transfer in March of 1984,2 a new wrinkle was added to
the debate for determining the rights, both legal and moral, of the various
parties involved when in vitro fertilization3 is used to produce pregnancy.4
This debate has been further fueled with the release of two reports by sepa-
rate Australian 5 and English6 committees brought together for the purpose
of making recommendations as to the continued use of in vitro fertilization.
Specifically, the committees addressed the issue of the disposition of cry-
opreserved embryos which, for various reasons, are unable to be implanted
in the mother for whom they were produced.7 The Australian committee
recommended that in the case of "orphaned" embryos,' where no agreed
1. "Cryopreservation" refers to the process developed by cryogenetic scientists whereby
living organisms are "frozen" in a state of suspended animation and later revived through a
"thawing out" process. In embryocryopreservation, the conceptus is first coated with a special
liquid solution designed to protect it from damage as freezing occurs. The storage container is
slowly cooled and eventually placed in a cannister of liquid nitrogen where storage occurs at
- 196* C. See WALLER COMMITTEE, infra note 5, at 14-15. For a discussion of cryonics
generally, see G. SMITH, MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF CRYONICS: PROSPECTS FOR IMMOR-
TALITY (1983).
2. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at A16, col. 1.
3. In vitro fertilization (IVF) is the process whereby sperm and egg are mated in a labo-
ratory dish. See generally The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46-56. See G.
SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 104, 109, 110, 119, 147 (1981); Smith, Manipulat-
ing The Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L. J. 697 (1976).
4. For a discussion of various medical, legal, and social issues attendant on these tech-
niques of producing pregnancy, see Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Repro-
duction Technologies. 70 A.B.A. J. Aug. 1984, 50-56. See also Annas & Elias, In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medicolegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create A Fam-
ily, 17 FAM. L. Q. 199 (1983).
5. THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL IssuEs ARISING
FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro
Fertilization (Aug. 1984) (hereinafter cited as the WALLER COMMITrEE).
6. WARNOCK COMMITrEE, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation
and Embryology (July, 1984) (hereinafter cited as the WARNOCK COMMITTEE).
7. WALLER COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 29-34; WARNOCK COMMII'EE, supra note 6,
at 56.
8. The problem of "orphaned embryos" received widespread attention in Australia and
the United States due to the plane-crash deaths of a wealthy California couple, leaving in limbo
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provisions have been made at the time of storage, the embryo should be
removed from storage as soon as possible.9 The English committee recom-
mended that, under similar circumstances, the right of disposal should pass
to the storage authority.'0
A question that immediately comes to mind when considering the recom-
mendations of the committees is: What legal rights, if any, does a frozen
embryo have with respect to its individuality as some type of human entity?
The next question is: What rights might or should it have? Part I of this
Comment will focus on the two committees' recommendations as possible
solutions to the first question. Part II will then survey the second question
from a philosophical standpoint, considering first, the vigorous dissent regis-
tered in the report of the Australian Committee, and second, U.S. abortion
law i1 as a basis for determining by analogy how the question could be re-
solved under present law. Part III will discuss legislative and judicial at-
tempts, at both the federal and state level, to define life in the unborn. The
Comment will conclude with a determination that there is an urgent need for
uniform legislation in this country in order to preserve the intrinsic worth
and legal rights these human embryos invariably possess.
PART I: THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEES
A. The Warnock Committee
The Warnock Committee, established in 1982, considered a broad spec-
trum of issues spawned by in vitro fertilization (IVF) techniques,' 2 including
two frozen embryos in the Australian IVF program. See N.Y. Times, June 24, 1984, at E7,
col. 1; Sellar, Orphan Embryosx 309 NATURE 738 (1984). See also Wash. Times, Sept. 5, 1984,
at A7, col. 2. See Smith, Australia's Frozen Orphan Embryos: A Medical, Legal and Ethical
Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27 (1985).
9. WALLER CoMMFTrEE, supra note 5, at 29.
10. WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 56.
11. The interesting new addition to the right-to-life debate facilitated by advancements in
reproductive technology is that the question of fetal rights must now be considered in the
context where the fetus is outside the womb. Under U.S. abortion law, this would appear to be
a significant twist given the nature of the right to have an abortion, i.e., based upon privacy. Is
this right to contemplate termination of pregnancy and, therefore, the fetus, as strong when the
fetus is not in the mother's womb? Does this situation somehow give the father of the embryo,
regardless of the stage of development, a greater right over the fetus while it is outside the
womb than he would if it were implanted? See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down that portion of a statute requiring spousal consent
before obtaining an abortion).
12. Some of the issues addressed by both committees, including the propriety of continu-
ing the process and practice of IVF and cryonic preservation of embryos, the use of surrogate
mothers, and the possibility of successfully freezing sperm and ova are beyond the scope of this
article, which is primarily concerned with determining the rights of embryos given the exist-
ence of this technology. For a general discussion of IVF-related issues, see Annas & Elias,
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those connected with human embryology. 13 It concluded that IVF tech-
niques had passed the research stage and could be regarded as an established
form of treatment for infertility. 14 The Committee was also of the opinion
that the technique of freezing, thawing, and transferring embryos was at the
stage where the clinical use of these practices should continue to be devel-
oped under review by a licensing body."'
In terms of issues and recommendations specifically concerning the status
or possible status of the human embryo, the Committee considered the rights
of the embryo in the context of scientific research.' 6 As a starting point, the
Committee recognized that the answer to the question of what status ought
to be accorded to the human embryo must necessarily be in terms of ethical
or moral principles.' 7 The majority held, however, that while the in vitro
embryo enjoys some type of "special" status, close monitoring and necessary
research should be allowed to continue in order to facilitate advances in the
technique.' 8
supra note 4; Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Human Beings, 304 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 336 (1981); Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for
Litigation, 35 Sw. L. J. 973 (1982). See also Hodgen, In Vitro Fertilization and Alternatives,
246 J. A.M.A. 590 (1981); Studdard, The Morality ofIn Vitro Fertilization, 5 HUM. L. REV. 41
(1979). See generally Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69
VA. L. REV. 465 (1983); Walters, Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Review of the Ethical Liter-
ature, 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23 (1979).
13. The Committee clarified the term "embryology... tak[ing] as our starting point the
meeting of egg and sperm at fertilisation. We have regarded the embryonic stage to be the six
weeks immediately following fertilisation which usually corresponds with the first eight weeks
of gestation counted from the first day of the woman's last menstrual period." WARNOCK
COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 5.
14. Id. at 34.
15. Id. at 53-54. The Committee also recommended that 1) there be a maximum of ten
years for storage of embryos after which time the right to use or dispose should pass to the
storage authority, 2) legislation should be enacted to insure there is no right of ownership in a
human embryo, 3) when one of a couple dies the right to use or dispose of any embryo stored
by that couple should pass to the survivor, 4) when both parents die the right of disposal
should pass to the storage authority, and 5) when no agreement exists between the couple as to
the use of the stored embryo, the right to determine use or disposal should pass to the storage
authority as though the ten-year period had expired. Id. at 56-57.
16. See generally id. at 58-69.
17. Id. at 60. The Committee briefly discussed the current position of the in vivo embryo
under the laws of the United Kingdom, but found them to be inadequate to provide protection
for the in vitro embryo. Id. at 62-63.
18. Id. at 63-64. Cf WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 6, expression of dissent, at 90-
93; EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY,
OPINION FOR THE LEGAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ON EXPERIMENTS ON LIVE HUMAN EM-
BRYOS (1983) ("In this difficult field the European Parliament cannot disregard these princi-
ples which, in general and but for well-defined exceptions, prohibit the right to take human
life, even that of an embryo, which is at least potentially a human life." Id. at 6. "In light of
the above arguments, the Committee on Energy and Research considers that the following
19861
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The Committee was closely divided, however, on the question of under
what conditions research on embryos may take place, given its previous find-
ing that the embryo enjoys some type of "special" status. It first recom-
mended that no live human embryo derived from in vitro fertilization,
whether frozen or unfrozen, may be kept alive, if not transferred, beyond 14
days after fertilization, nor may it be used as a research subject beyond this
period.' 9 Second, "spare" embryos may be used as subjects for research dur-
ing this period with the consent of the couple for whom the embryo was
generated;2' however, a majority recommended that legislation be enacted
providing that research may be carried out on any embryo resulting from in
vitro fertilization, regardless of whether the embryo was intentionally or un-
intentionally produced for that purpose.2 '
B. The Waller Committee
Among the various issues addressed by the Australian Committee2 2 was a
consideration of "whether the community and the parties (that is, the do-
nors, the embryo and the medical and scientific personnel) involved in the
process of IVF have any rights and/or obligations and, if so, whether such
rights and/or obligations should be enforced, in legislative form or other-
wise.",23 More specifically, two situations bearing most directly on the in-
dependent rights of embryos were considered: where surplus embryos are
either intentionally or unintentionally produced in the laboratory, exceeding
the number appropriate for transfer to the uterus of the intended mother;24
and where postponement of intended embryo transfer leads to circum-
stances, such as accident, death, or dissolution, making it impossible for sub-
proposals should be made. . . whilst not prohibiting from the outset all research and experi-
mentation which has been carefully considered to be necessary, guarantee at the same time, in
accordance with general ethical principles, the inviolability of the dignity and of the physical
and moral integrity of all human beings." Id. at 7).
19. WARNOCK COMMFIEE, supra note 6, at 66.
20. Id. at 66-67.
21. Id. at 69. But see WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 6, expression of dissent, at 94;
cf infra notes 31-35.
22. See supra note 12.
23. WALLER COMMITrEE, supra note 5, at 2 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 11. The distinction between intentional and unintentional creation of excess
embryos would appear to be important with respect to their subsequent disposition. While the
Committee attempts to harmonize its recommendations on disposition in either instance, the
Chairman of the Human Reproduction Biology Unit at the Royal Women's Hospital told the
Committee that any excess embryos produced at the hospital are allowed to succumb, id. at 12,
which would appear to give the embryos "rights" only when they are able to be immediately
transferred. Thus, an arbitrary selection process at this hospital determines which, if any,
embryo will be given the chance to be implanted.
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sequent transfer to the intended mother.2"
In the first instance, the Committee recommended that, after short-term
storage,2 6 the decision made by the couple whose sperm and ova have been
used in the formation of the embryo2 7 should be given effect, either by 1)
donation of stored embryos to other couples participating in the IVF pro-
gram, 2) donation of excess embryos for research or experiment, or 3) re-
moval from storage.2" In the second situation, the Committee opined that
the "embryo shall be removed from storage," 29 similar to the third alterna-
tive for couples in the first situation.
Another issue addressed by the Waller Committee relating to the question
of rights of the embryo was whether experimentation and research on em-
bryos should be continued in the Victoria IVF program. 30 A majority of the
Committee concluded that research on embryos should be allowed in order
to facilitate the possibility of enhancing IVF technology, 3' but that experi-
mentation should only be allowed on excess embryos.3 2 This view was based
25. Id. at 30-31. The Committee takes the position that, should subsequent transfer of an
intentionally-produced embryo prove impossible due to prohibitive medical or other condi-
tions of the intended transferee, the parents would exercise a non-absolute right of choice over
disposition, a right in some ways analogous to those recognized in parents of a child after its
birth, id. at 27, opting for either 1) donation to another couple, 2) donation for research or
experimentation, or 3) removal from storage. Id. at 29.
26. The Committee notes that, in certain instances, such as where the woman whose ova
have been used is undergoing prolonged chemotherapy, long-term storage upon consent of the
couple, reviewable after five years, may be appropriate. Id. at 30.
27. In the future, it is recommended that couples participating in embryo-freezing pro-
grams be required to determine at the time ofstorage what disposition shall be undertaken if
implantation should later prove impossible, i.e., conditional disposition. Id. at 32.
28. Id. at 29. See also Kass, Ethical Issues in Human In Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Cul-
ture and Research, and Embryo Transfer, a paper prepared for the Ethics Advisory Board,
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, at 13-14, 1978, cited at 44 Fed. Reg.
35,042 (1979).
29. WALLER COMMITrEE, supra note 5, at 32. The Committee notes that "removal of the
frozen embryo from storage is in some ways similar to the removal of life-support systems
from a mortally ill person. Life is allowed to end. This does seem to accord the embryo a
measure of that respect which is so often spoken of in relation to it." Id. at 29.
30. "The options available in relation to embryo research are complete prohibition, re-
search allowed only on excess or spare embryos, which come into existence as part of IVF
programmes for the treatment of infertility, or research on embryos formed specifically for that
purpose." Id. at 44-45. It is also noted that "without embryo research in the early days of
IVF the technique, which today is producing many hundreds of pregnancies per year through-
out the world, would never have been successful." Id. at 35.
31. "Where the number of embryos produced exceeds the number acceptable for transfer,
the couple who produced the embryo shall make a decision about their use. . . . It is possible
that some couples will agree to make some available for research purposes .... " Id. at 46.
32. Two members of the Committee dissented from this view to the extent that they advo-
cated formation of embryos specifically for research or experimentation, arguing that it is ethi-
cally acceptable for embryos to be created for those purposes due to the fact that restriction to
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upon a moral premise that the embryo in its individual capacity as a human
"entity" should be accorded a certain level of respect greater than that of an
organism created for purely experimental purposes.3 3 The Committee, em-
ploying a balancing test of sorts, indicated that such research should be al-
lowed to bolster the success rate of Victoria's IVF program.34 It was also
recommended that the use of any embryo for research be immediate, prohib-
iting development beyond the stage of implantation, generally 14 days after
fertilization is accomplished.35
Thus, a majority of both committees' members rejected the idea that the
untransferred embryo has any independent, legally recognizable or protect-
able rights, 36 refusing to recommend that legal and moral "personhood" sta-
excess embryos would make many aspects of potentially beneficial research impossible. Id. at
75. Two other members were wholly opposed to any research on embryos which prevents
implantation or where there is no intention that the embryo created should be transferred to a
recipient uterus. Id. at 45, 62-74. See also Tieffel, Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Conserva-
tive View, 247 J. A.M.A. 3235 (1982).
33. "From a moral perspective, it may be said that, regardless of the particular level of
respect which different sections of the community would accord an embryo, this individual
and genetically unique human entity may not be formed solely and from the outset to be used
as a means for any other human purpose, however laudable. Where the formation occurs in
the course of an IVF procedure for the treatment of infertility, the reasons which lead to the
embryo's existence are not 'means to an end' ones." Id. at 46.
34. It is hoped that through new research on excess embryos combined with continued
experimentation with presently unsuccessful ova freezing techniques, "the morally difficult de-
cisions regarding the use of excess embryos-to allow to succumb in culture, to use for re-
search, to use for embryo donation, or to freeze for subsequent use-would arise less
frequently." Id. at 45.
35. "It is after this stage that the primitive streak is formed, and differentiation of the
embryo is clearly evident. In no circumstances shall any embryo which has been made avail-
able for research be frozen for some unspecified future purpose." Id. at 47. Karl Rahner notes
that during these first few weeks the existence of a "human subject" is seriously doubtful.
Rahner, The Problem of Genetic Manipulation, 9 THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 236 (1972)
Cf South Australian Health Commission-Working Party, Recommendation 18: That fertil-
ized gamete(s) of human beings should never be used for scientific or genetic experimentation,
cited in WALLER COMMITrEE, supra note 5, at 43.
36. "But the earlier recommendations also make it clear that the Committee considers
that safe storage of the embryo, under the conditions specified in each case, may be protected,
where necessary, by legal action." WALLER COMMITrEE, supra note 5, at 33.
In the United States, it has long been recognized that unborn fetuses can be heirs at law. See
Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1882); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255 (1834); Aubuchon v.
Bender, 44 Mo. 560 (1869); Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907); In re
Holthausen's Will, 175 Misc. 1022, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct. 1941). In order for the child to
take under the will or trust, however, the infant must be born alive. But see WALLER COM-
MIrEE, supra note 5, at 33 (rejecting the idea that untransferred embryos should be regarded
as possessing rights or claims to inheritances). See also L.A. Times, June 21, 1984, at 3, col. 4.
There is also a line of authority emerging in recent years allowing parents to sue under the
wrongful death statutes in actions to recover damages for the death of a viable fetus. See infra
notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
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tus be accorded the embryo. Implicit in this refusal is the idea that the
embryo enjoys something less than the degree of rights normally vested in
persons. It is also not entirely clear what rights the parents have over the
stored embryo.37 Yet the Waller Committee did consider "that the couple
whose gametes are used to form the embryo in the context of an IVF pro-
gramme should be recognized as having rights which are in some ways
analogous to those recognized in parents of a child after its birth. The Com-
mittee does not consider that those rights are absolute, just as the rights of
parents are limited by the rights and interests of the child, and by the larger
concerns of the community in which they all live.",
38
Also, in the Australian report a distinction concerning subsequent disposi-
tion is drawn upon factual circumstances arguably irrelevant to the in-
dependent status and intrinsic worth of the embryo: when the parents are
present, choice can be exercised; when the embryo is orphaned, the only
option is that the embryo be "allowed" to expire. In essence, by refusing to
define positively what the scope of the right is or should be, opting instead
for a process-of-elimination approach as to what it is not, the Committee
implicitly rejected the fundamental philosophical and scientific premise that
life begins at conception, as well as the legal premise that the embryo or
early fetus outside the womb should be accorded any recognizable, protect-
able rights.
PART II: THE POSSIBLE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE
UNTRANSFERRED EMBRYO
A. The Embryo as a Moral Human "Person"
1. The Waller Committee Report's Dissent
The Waller Committee report produced one lone dissenter, Reverend Dr.
Francis Harman, with respect to the entire issue of freezing embryos as a
part of Victoria's IVF program.39 In rejecting the argument held by many
that the embryo is simply an "indeterminate mass of cells with the potential
to become human and that this potential cannot translate into actuality until
37. "The Committee does not regard the couple whose embryo is stored as having domin-
ion over that embryo. It considers that those concepts should not be imported into and have
no place in a consideration of issues which focus on an individual and genetically unique
human entity . . . [thus] the couple may not sell or casually dispose of the embryo." Id. at 27-
28. See also WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 56.
38. WALLER COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 27.
39. For the second time in the life of this Committee I find myself 'a lone lorn creetur' like
Dickens' Mrs. Gummidge, pleading the human embryo's case for inclusion amongst the liber-
tarian movements of our day." WALLER COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 62.
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there is some degree of fetal development,"'' Reverend Dr. Harman states
his position:
[T]he early embryo is actually a human cell with the inherent po-
tential to develop that humanness. This diploid is not just a fur-
ther progression of haploids (sperm/ovum) but a new entity as
distinct ontologically from each haploid as water is distinct from
hydrogen and oxygen, and in the earliest (pre-implantation) phase
subsistent in itself but already forming a hormonal bond of a spe-
cifically human type with its maternal host. To this basic biologi-
cal data, rational processes lead theists to add the concepts of
creation, ensoulment and immortality; reason enlightened by faith
leads Christians to add the concepts of redemption; but the com-,
mon denominator is that 'intuitively we do not equate a fertilized
egg with a hamster or a piece of mouse tissue:' (Professor Ian Ken-
nedy in The Times, 26 June 1984). Intuitive as that reaction may
be, it does not lose any of its force for that reason since in any
moral judgment in the area of basic human values there is a certain
prethematic and instinctive component which cannot be totally re-
flected in analytical discourse or legally accountable terms but
which is nonetheless real.
41
Extrapolating from this "intuitive reaction" approach concerning the
moral status of the embryo, Reverend Dr. Harman argues that the concept
40. Id. at 63. "This view fragments into a wide spectrum of opinions when it comes to
specifying the precise stage of development, with some placing it at implantation, others
favouring a time when twinning and recombination are no longer possible, yet others looking
to the formation of the cerebral substratum for human thought, and finally others who demand
the presence of 'interests' and 'preferences' and require 'a concept of self as a continuing sub-
ject of experiences and other mental states' and a belief 'that it itself is such a continuing
entity.' This last viewpoint clearly challenges the human biological status not only of the
embryo but of anyone who lacks 'morally relevant characteristics' (e.g., rationality, self-con-
sciousness, awareness, autonomy, pleasure and pain), or who suffers a substantial decline in or
loss of such characteristics at any time after birth. Thus the way is paved for infanticide and
euthanasia." Id.
41. Id at 63-64. "In other words, such terms as 'zygote,' 'embryo,' 'fetus' merely indicate
successive stages of development in exactly the same way as do the terms 'infancy,' 'child-
hood,' 'adolescence'. . . . [During the latter stages] no one asserts that a 'different' being is
formed." Id. at 66. For a philosophical analysis rejecting the idea that the humanity of a
being can be determined at any time other than conception, see J. NOONAN, THE MORALITY
OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (1970). Cf Warren, On the Moral
and Legal Status ofAbortion, 57 MONIST 43, 53 (1973) (distinguishing "human" in the genetic
sense from "human" in the moral sense and arguing that a conceptus is not a human in the
moral sense and thus does not enjoy the same rights as those humans who are). Others prefer
to straddle the fence, arguing that the fetus from conception has partial moral status modified
by the competing interests of the mother. See D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND
MORALITY (1970); English, Abortion and the Concept of a Person, 5 CAN. J. PHIL. 233 (1975).
Although this latter position is more relevant during the later stages of pregnancy, the concept
is worth noting when discussing the possible existence of independent rights of the conceptus.
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of "personhood" can now be introduced to the extent that those essential
qualities constituting identity are present.4 ' This apparent attempt to blur
the distinction some would make between genetic humanness and moral hu-
manness43 is explained in terms of the embryo possessing "both intra-entity
and inter-entity elements which give a high degree of probability, if not cer-
tainty, to incipient or rudimentary personhood in the embryo."
44
Reverend Dr. Harman thus concludes: "Philosophically. . . and with a
sound scientific basis, it is at least highly probable (emphasis added) that the
combination of human biological entity plus sharply defined individual ge-
netic characteristics plus basic relational framework constitutes rudimentary
or incipient personhood and justifies putting about the early embryo the
question 'Who is it?' ,45
2. The Concept of Moral Certainty and the Human Embryo
The language of the dissent strongly suggests that the idea of "moral cer-
tainty" is somewhat significant to a discussion of the status we should accord
the embryo.46 The argument would be something as follows: Based upon
the existing facts that we know to be true or certain about the embryo (i.e., it
is human tissue, it has genetic individuality, it at least has a potential to
become an "actual" person, whatever that may be, and a high probability
exists that this potential will be realized if implantation occurs), a quantum
42. WALLER COMMITrEE, supra note 5, at 64-65.
43. See Warren, supra note 41.
44. Id. at 65. "Intra-entity" elements are those found in the data supplied by molecular
genetics, gathered irrevocably in the newly-formed embryo's DNA; "inter-entity," or rational,
elements are those derived from the fact that "the early embryo is already involved in funda-
mental human relationships (paternity, maternity, affiliation) which should develop in due
course into a network of familial and social links, rights and responsibilities as a person-in-the-
community." Id. For a discussion of DNA generally, see G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND
THE LAW 193-215 (1981).
45. WALLER COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 66 (emphasis in original).
46. The Encyclopedia of Bioethics describes this concept as follows: "A certain con-
science is a moral judgment made without fear of error based on evidence or motives that are
sound. A doubtful conscience exists when the intellect suspends judgment because of insuffi-
cient evidence. A certain conscience must always be obeyed and is also a necessary require-
ment for moral action. A doubtful conscience must become certain in practice before one can
act." IV ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcS 1527 (1978). Henry Davis also defines it: "Certainty
of conscience depends on the certainty with which I draw my conclusion, consciously or im-
plicitly, as to the morality of a given concrete act. Certainty based on evident principles is
absolute certainty; if it is based not on evident principles but on what appear to be such good
reasons, or on such sufficiently good authority that prudent doubt is excluded, the certainty is
said to be perfect moral certainty. Neither absolute nor perfect moral certainty can always be
obtained; we must, therefore, be satisfied sometimes with a degree of certainty that is imper-
fect, where a mistake is quite possible but not likely." I MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY
69 (6th ed. 1949).
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of "certainty" that we are dealing with a human person is reached to the
extent that treating the embryo as anything but a person would be immoral.
Legally, it would follow that the law should thus protect the rights of this
being that we have just determined to a degree of moral certainty is actually
human in the same way we protect the rights of people generally.
Others would argue that moral certainty of actual personhood is not nec-
essary, opting instead for the view that the law ought to recognize the inher-
ent potential to become an actual human to the same degree of certainty and
attach legal rights to this potential.47 This hybrid approach to the argument
of moral certainty that the embryo is a person introduces the element of
probability into the "equation."48 Since the chances are very good that the
embryo will later develop into an actual mature human being,4 9 we can be
morally certain that there is a probable continuity between this embryo and
an actual mature human being. The same degree of respect, or rights,
should therefore be accorded to the potential human as to the actual human
because we are not morally justified in discriminating against a human life
merely because of a difference in the realization of its potential' 0
Still others might argue that neither moral certainty nor a high degree of
probability that the embryo is actually or potentially a human life is neces-
sary to mandate protection of the embryo. ' This argument is premised on
the idea that, because of the fact of uncertainty as to the status of the em-
bryo, we are morally obligated to give it the benefit of the doubt and treat it
as a person until we have moral certainty that the embryo is something other
47. See Johnstone, The Moral Status of the Embryo: Two Viewpoints, in J. WALTERS & T.
SINGER, TEST-TUBE BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES 55 (1982). Johnstone prefers the term "respect" rather than "rights."
IA at 51.
48. Id. at 54. Cf Tauer, The Tradition of Probabilism and the Moral Status of the Early
Embryo, 45 THEO. STUDIES 3 (1984).
49. Johnstone, supra note 47, at 55. Johnstone notes that the chances are sometimes said
to be four out of five, but that the precise figures are not important or essential to the
argument.
50. Noonan, Abortion and the Catholic Church: A Summary History, 12 NATURAL L. F.
85 (1968). This is an interesting concept since potentiality arguments can also be made after a
child is born. Some would argue that even after birth, a "person" is not "morally" human
until certain characteristics are present. See P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 119-24 (1979).
One context where this argument often arises concerns the status of defective or handicapped
newborns, which are sometimes allowed to die based upon "quality of life" judgments. Recent
Congressional legislation has directly addressed this issue. See Child Abuse Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 457, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 98 Stat. 1749 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-
106) prohibiting the withholding of medically indicated treatment, including nutrition, hydra-
tion, and medication, from handicapped infants' life threatening conditions.
51. See Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Declaration on Abortion (1975),
discussed in Tauer, supra note 48, at 31-32; cf Destro, infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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than an "actual" person.52
Another argument can be raised which is generally opposed to the whole
notion of "legislating" moral principles into our body of law, a position tra-
ditionally held by legal positivists. 3 This position is vulnerable to attack in
this context, however, for at least two very important reasons. First, it is
difficult to justify the refusal of a legal system in a civilized society to take
positive steps to protect what many within that society would maintain is
innocent human life. Basic moral foundational principles of this nature are
the very mores upon which societies such as ours are built.54 Indeed, one
could argue that this is primarily a legal, not a philosophical, idea inherent
in the concept of an ordered democratic society, and any moral implications
are at best coincidental. Others would argue that in these foundational areas
of legal principles, morality and the law are inextricably linked, creating a
basis upon which future laws may rest."
Second, our society already recognizes the idea of moral certainty, or
something very much like it, as a bona fide concept already embedded into
areas of our legal system. One example is the death penalty. Our society
allows itself, through the judgments made by the triers of fact, to sentence
criminals to death in narrowly defined situations, based upon the nature of
the crime, the burden of proof, evidentiary considerations, and mitigating
circumstances. This area of the law holds that at a time when it is able to
legally establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and because of the overrid-
ing concerns of society coupled with this legal finding, society can be morally
certain that the death penalty is appropriate at this time for this criminal
who committed this specific offense. The due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments of our Constitution would appear to support this
line of reasoning to a fairly substantial degree.
B. Abortion Law in the United States
5 6
A virtual avalanche of literature has descended upon us from both propo-
52. See generally sources cited supra note 51.
53. For a classic explanation of the theory of legal positivism, see Hart, Positivism and the
Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
54. See WARNOCK COMMITrEE, supra note 6, at 2-3.
55. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 14 (1967).
56. This section is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of abortion law. Rather, it is
an attempt to extract the relevant principles announced in Roe, infra, and juxtapose them in
the context of the unimplanted embryo. Given the strength of the pro-life position, depending
on the success of proposed Congressional legislation, see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text, and the future make-up of the U.S. Supreme Court, see Thomas, Court at the Crossroads,
TIME, Oct. 8, 1984, at 28, legal trends in one area of the law might have a profound influence
upon the other. Also, the approaches taken by the committees and the U.S. Supreme Court
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nents and opponents of abortion, arguing in favor of everything from a con-
stitutional amendment protecting the life of the fetus from the moment of
conception5 7 to the absolute right of the mother to terminate her pregnancy
at any stage.5 8 The concern here, however, is with the status of the unim-
planted embryo, or more specifically, what that status might be, given the
nature of the abortion right as it exists in the United States today. 9
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court announced that a woman had a
fundamental constitutional right to choose to have an abortion." The Court
derived this right from cases creating a substantive due process right of pri-
vacy in familial and sexual matters.6 ' Though the nature of the right has
evolved somewhat,62 the fundamental elements of the test employed today
are virtually the same.63
In Roe v. Wade,"4 the Court articulated a balancing test in order to deter-
are very similar in that each "disposes" of the issue by implicitly defining away the positive
rights there might be by explicitly defining the rights, at least to a much more significant
degree, of the other parties involved, i.e., the mother, the parents of the embryo, and the State.
For a discussion criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court approach in Roe, see Destro, Some Fresh
Perspectives on the Abortion Controversy, 4 HUM. LIFE REV. 22 (1978). For a discussion of the
constitutional issues pertaining to IVF and embryo transfer generally, see Report of the Ethics
Board, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,048 (1979).
57. See, e.g., Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective
Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975).
58. See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 U. VA. L. REv. 405 (1983); Note, Due Process Privacy and the Path of
Progress, U. ILL. L. F. 469, 471 (1979) (stressing the importance of the substantive due process
right of privacy). See also Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ.
L. REv. 263 (1984).
59. Some of the more important abortion decisions include Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (companion case to Roe v. Wade, holding that states may not make abortions unreason-
ably difficult to obtain by instituting elaborate procedural barriers); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating those portions of a statute requir-
ing spousal and parental consent); Bellotti v. Baird (II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding that a
state must provide an alternative procedure to procure authorization in cases where parental
consent is denied for a minor seeking an abortion or if the minor does not want to seek paren-
tal consent); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, (1983)
(reaffirming Roe to-the extent that government cannot interfere with the fundamental right of a
woman to have an abortion).
60. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court struck down a Texas statute proscrib-
ing abortion except when necessary to save the life of the mother.
61. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization of habitual criminals); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (child-rearing and education).
62. See Comment, Abortion: From Roe to Akron, Changing Standards of Analysis, 33
CATS. U. L. REv. 393 (1984).
63. But see Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983),
generally criticizing the Court's adherence to stare decisis in reaffirming Roe, and denouncing
the trimester approach as unworkable and inconsistent with current medical technology.
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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mine the prevailing rights and interests of the parties involved in the abor-
tion decision. Specifically, the woman's privacy right to make procreative
decisions to the extent that she could choose to terminate her pregnancy was
balanced against the State's "compelling interest" to protect, at one point,
maternal health65 and, at a subsequent point, "potential life" in the unborn
fetus.66 Only when the fetus reaches the "compelling" point of viability, or
that time when the fetus "presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside of the mother's womb,",67 does the State's interest in protecting fetal
life reach a degree sufficient that it may go so far as to proscribe abortion
during the period after viability, except when it is necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother.68
The Court attempted to avoid the question of when life begins by specifi-
cally claiming that it was not addressing that very question. The Court
noted, "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theol-
ogy are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer." 69 The effect, however, of stamping the point of viability with the
"compelling state interest" in terms of when the fetus can be legally pro-
tected was to deny the proposition that an unborn fetus is a "person" within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.7" The Court also denied the fact
that a viable fetus was actually a person in favor of the term "potential life,"
to be protected by the State only when it chooses to exercise its right to do
SO.
7 1
From the language of the opinion itself, it would appear that some type of
presumption exists as to defining the rights of the fetus: since one cannot
positively identify a pre-viable fetus as any type of legally protectable life,
i.e., human being, the assumption will be made that any rights the fetus may
have are automatically subordinate to those of the mother until the doubt as
to its status is resolved. But until that time, and upon the basis of this doubt,
65. Id. at 163.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 163-64.
69. Id. at -159.
70. Id. at 158. See also Destro, supra note 57, at 1252-53.
71. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 ("In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to
the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential [emphasis in original] life is involved, the
State may [emphasis added] assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman
alone."); id. at 163-64 ("If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability it may go
so far as to proscribe abortion during that period").
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the privacy right of the mother supersedes what could later turn out to be a
right to life of the fetus.
The Court in Roe, then, effectively succeeded in defining the nature and
scope of the abortion right without considering in any meaningful way the
independent interests, whatever they may be, of a very important third
party-the unborn child.72 This approach would be unrealistic when fetal
rights are considered in the context of an externally produced and (tempo-
rarily) sustained embryo.7 3 First, the nature of the abortion right is such
that the privacy interest of the mother prevails over all others except the
State's, and only then when its interests become compelling. This nebulous
privacy right appears to be tied, somehow, to the bodily connection between
the woman and her unborn child. There is no such connection, however,
when an embryo is produced in vitro and has not yet been implanted. Unless
the embryo is to be treated as the chattel of the mother,74 the mother herself
would not be able to make the determination that the embryo should die.
Therefore, the nature of the decision in this context would be fundamentally
different from that allowed in the abortion context, 7 5 yet rights of the same
parties are at stake in both situations.
In response to this, one might argue that the privacy right of the mother is
not relevant when the embryo is outside the womb, and that the determina-
tion as to its disposition should be left to the parents and doctors. If a court
were to decide such a case on these grounds, however, it might be argued
that an illogical distinction would be drawn with respect to the procreative
right of privacy discussed in Roe when termination of pregnancy is contem-
plated. In the abortion context, the embryo has absolutely no right to be
brought to term, and the decision of the mother in most instances is final.
When the embryo is unimplanted, however, it is possible that its ultimate
disposition could be in dispute as between the couple who produced it:76 one
party might demand implantation, while the other opts for removal from
storage. 77 If the embryo were to be subsequently implanted, the mother
72. Destro notes that "the Court was able to compromise the interests of the unborn by
defining away their rights . . . . The Court completely omitted any discussion of why the
unborn should or should not have any rights of their own. The rationale behind this marshal-
ling of interests and necessity for this approach to the issues were left unexplained." Destro,
supra note 57, at 1254.
73. See supra note 11.
74. See WARNOCK COMMIrEE, supra note 6, at 56.
75. Indeed, the Warnock Committee particularly stressed the need for new laws to cope
with previously uncontemplated situations made possible by new techniques for alleviating
infertility, including embryology. Id. at 7.
76. Id. at 56-57.
77. See Henahan, Fertilization, Embryo Transfer Procedures Raise Many Questions, 252 J.
A.M.A. 877 (1984).
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would presumably still have the right to abort it. But the legitimate dispute
as to its disposition would have already been raised, something which is not
even possible if the embryo were conceived and sustained totally in vivo. "I
Second, the situation might arise where the intended mother of a cry-
opreserved embryo dies, and the father wishes the embryo to be implanted.
Assuming a willing surrogate mother can be found, what rights does the
genetic father have if the surrogate later contemplates an abortion?79 If a
court would disallow the abortion, another distinction would be drawn,
making the relevant factor either in whom the embryo is implanted, (i.e., the
genetic mother v. the surrogate) or giving the genetic father the right of
determination the genetic mother would normally have exercised. 0 In this
latter instance, a further dilemma would arise if the father later decides that
he wants the fetus aborted. Would such a situation in any way affect the
independent rights of the embryo or fetus? Conversely, if the court were to
allow the abortion, the rights of a couple, the wife of which is unable to carry
a child to term, would be subordinated to the surrogate, who is not the natu-
ral mother of the child. This determination of rights could only be accom-
plished by expanding in a very significant way the right of abortion
recognized in Roe.
Thus, while it is unclear as to how the status of the embryo's rights them-
selves would be affected in situations similar to those discussed above, it
appears that the nature of the fundamental right expounded in Roe would be
substantially altered if such law were somehow thought to apply. Even if the
standards in Roe were held to be irrelevant in this particular context, a new
procreative right in the family in this context would one way or another be
determined, and it is unlikely that the prospective rights of the embryo
would be totally ignored, as they were in Roe. Given the state of present
medical technology, such a result in and of itself would warrant, or even
demand, that a serious re-thinking of the principles expounded in Roe be
undertaken."
78. Thus, the status of an embryo would appear to depend upon whether it is implanted
or unimplanted. Cf infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. Although its independent sta-
tus might not be affected by such a distinction, the rights of the parties involved in the termina-
tion decision are substantially affected. This possibility goes far to point out the underlying
problem with Roe: complete disregard of medical and biological reality with respect to the
independent status of the fetus.
79. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 53-56.
80. Cf Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking
down, inter alia, that portion of a statute requiring a married woman to obtain her husband's
consent for an abortion during the first trimester).
81. See generally Brief for the United States as amicus curiae in Support of Appellants in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, appeal docketed, No. 84-
495 (U.S., July 15, 1985).
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PART III: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL EFFORTS TO DEFINE
LIFE IN THE UNBORN
This section is primarily concerned with attempts by the Congress, state
legislatures, and the courts to accord the unborn child the legal status of
"personhood."
A. Federal Law
Since 1973, constitutional amendments have repeatedly been introduced
in Congress in an attempt to overturn the Supreme Court decision in Roe v.
Wade, 2 including most recently a first-ever Senate floor debate on Senate
Joint Resolution 3.3 Similarly, bills attempting to prohibit abortion by stat-
ute and declaring that life begins at conception have been proposed during
recent sessions of Congress. 4
With respect to the status of the unimplanted embryo, it appears that leg-
islation defining life to begin at conception and providing constitutional pro-
82. These amendments basically take two forms: a) one would return to the states the
power to set the standards for when abortions are appropriate, including the ability to prohibit
them entirely, and b) another would define a new "right to life" in the unborn, which the
Court in Roe said did not exist under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. According to the
language of the various proposals, the right would attach at "conception," "moment of fertili-
zation" or "at any stage of biological development." See generally Byrn, A Human Life
Amendment: What Would It Mean?, I HUM. LIFE REV. 50 (1975). Cf Callahan, Raw Data v.
Wisdom, 19 SOCIETY 70 (1982).
83. S.J. Res. 3 as debated on the Senate floor would have overturned Roe to the extent
that the decision nationalized the regulation of abortion. The States would generally have had
the power to legislate on any matters concerning abortion. The measure was defeated by a
roll call vote of 50-49, with one senator voting "present." Because the proposal was an amend-
ment to the Constitution, two-thirds of both houses of Congress needed to approve it before
submitting it to the states. For a review of the debate on S.J. Res. 3, see 129 CONG. REC. S.
9265 (daily ed. June 28, 1983).
84. See proposals, in the 98th Congress, including H.R. 618, introduced by Rep. Henry
Hyde, providing, inter alia, for expedited Supreme Court review of lower court decisions
which overturn state laws restricting abortion and infanticide; S. 26 and S. 210, introduced by
Senator Jesse Helms, declaring that life begins at conception and that the State has a compel-
ling interest to protect human life, as well as removing inferior federal court jurisdiction. The
authority for this type of federal action is contained in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
which empowers Congress to enforce the due process and equal protection rights of the
amendment. See Hyde, The Human Life Bill Some Issues and Answers, 8 HuM. LIFE REV.
(1982). Unlike constitutional amendments, which require approval by two-thirds of both
houses of Congress and three-quarters of the States, statutes need only pass by a simple major-
ity of each house of Congress. The courts could later declare these federal statutes unconstitu-
tional, however, a highly probable result given the present state of the abortion right as a
constitutional guarantee. Yet some of the statutory proposals would have explicitly with-
drawn jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to review state abortion laws. See, e.g., S. 1741,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 (1981); H.R. 3225, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 (1981); S. 158, 97th
Cong. 1st Sess., § 2 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1981).
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tection for the unborn under the fifth and fourteenth amendments would
prohibit a doctor and consenting parents from independently determining
that a frozen embryo "shall be removed from storage" and "allowed to suc-
cumb." In the case of the orphaned embryo, it is unclear what effect this
legislation would have on the ability of the State to remove the embryo from
storage or to donate it to another couple participating in an IVF program.85
It is apparent, however, that such a life-protective amendment would cre-
ate a serious constitutional dilemma if the right to an abortion is not explic-
itly prohibited. The due process right of life which would be recognized in
the fetus would have to be weighed against the procreative right of privacy
recognized in the mother. Similarly, a due process right of life would be
recognized in the unimplanted embryo, and the extent to which a state's
decision as to disposition would insure that right is not clear.
Federal statutes or constitutional amendments returning to the states the
power to legislate on these matters would allow them broad leeway in defin-
ing the rights of unborn children. These laws would, however, need to be
consistent in defining life in both the abortion and the IVF embryo context.
In other words, if a State passed a law prohibiting abortion at any time on
the ground that life begins at conception or that a State's "compelling inter-
est" in potential life outweighs whatever privacy right the mother might
have in procreative matters, principles of consistency would dictate that the
unimplanted embryo be accorded the same "right to life," though perhaps
not a right to be implanted. Also, some of these federal proposals would
allow direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court if the highest state
court invalidated a life-protective state statute.
A second area of federal legislative attempts relevant to the concept of
embryo or fetal rights is embodied in regulations dealing with experimenta-
tion on fetuses and IVF research.8 6 While these regulations are limited to
research which is in whole or in part funded by the federal government,"'
the research guidelines draw an important distinction with respect to the
possible rights of the unimplanted embryo.88
This distinction is borne out by the definition of "fetus" for the purposes
of the federal regulations: " 'Fetus' means the product of conception from
the time of implantation (as evidenced by any of the presumptive signs of
85. In the case of the orphaned embryo, it appears that the State could possibly become
the ward of the embryo and presumably would have the final word as to its ultimate disposi-
tion, unless a court would be willing to appoint a "relative" or even itself as guardian ad litem.
86. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.211 (1983).
87. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1983).
88. See Blumberg, Legal Issues in Nonsurgical Human Ovum Transfer, 251 J. A.M.A.
1178 (1984).
1986]
248 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:231
pregnancy, such as missed menses, or a medically acceptable pregnancy test)
.... "89 As a result of this definition, research on fetuses in utero and ex
utero is prohibited unless the purpose of the activity is to meet the health
needs of the particular fetus, or the risk to the fetus by such research is
minimal and the purpose of the activity is to develop important biomedical
knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.' Research on non-
viable fetuses ex utero is prohibited unless 1) vital functions will not be artifi-
cially maintained, 2) experimental activities which would terminate vital
functions are not used, and 3) the purpose of the research is to develop
otherwise unobtainable important biomedical knowledge.9
In vitro fertilization is defined as "any fertilization of human ova which
occurs outside of the body of a female, either through admixture of donor
human sperm and ova or by any other means." 92 The guidelines go on to
state that the issues raised by IVF are to be left to one or more established
ethical advisory boards, which are to review applications and recommend
proposals for federally funded research involving human IVF.93 The regula-
tions are silent as to the rationale for allowing a distinction as to the propri-
ety of research in the two situations,94 but as a few examples will show,
advances in medical technology mandate that a rationale, if one exists, now
be proposed.
First, by defining a fetus in terms of implantation,95 it would appear that
an unimplanted embryo which is able to develop successfully in an "artificial
womb"96 would not be accorded the same status under the regulations as a
fetus which develops in utero because it would never have been "implanted."
One might argue that "implantation" would encompass the artificial womb
situation. The definition of implantation within the context of the regula-
89. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c) (1983) (emphasis added).
90. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.208(a), -209(a)(1)-(2) (1983).
91. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.209(b)(1)-(3) (1983).
92. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(g)(1983).
93. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d) (1983).
94. But see 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526 (1975), where in the preamble to the amendments to 45
C.F.R. Part 46, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human
Services) concludes that:
Because biomedical research is not yet near the point of being able to maintain for a
substantial period the non-implanted product of in vitro fertilization, these regula-
tions do not address this point. Given the state of the research, we believe that regu-
lations would be premature. However, the Department anticipates that such
regulations will be prepared when the state of biomedical science so warrants.
95. By implantation it is assumed that period of time after which the embryo would nor-
mally implant on the wall of the uterus, usually about 14 days after conception, is meant, as
the language and context seem to indicate, rather than the time of transfer of an externally
produced embryo to the intended mother.
96. See WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 71-72; Roe, 410 U.S. at 161.
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tions does not support such a construction, however, since IVF issues are
expressly distinguished from in utero implantation with regard to the status
of the embryo for research purposes.
Second, a situation might arise where a woman has an embryo, whether
naturally or artificially conceived, removed from her uterus in order to un-
dergo some type of treatment which would otherwise harm the embryo. She
and her husband decide on cryopreservation until she can again receive the
embryo, but she later learns that she will not be able to carry the child to
term. Does the fact that the embryo was previously "implanted" give it
some type of rights under the regulations?9 (i.e., does the embryo subse-
quently become a "fetus ex utero" for the purposes of the regulations?) Or is
the embryo's present status as "unimplanted" determinative of its status with
respect to research or experimentation?
While these two examples might appear to be somewhat farfetched, they
are nonetheless possible and quite relevant to a discussion of fetal or embry-
onic rights under these particular regulations. Given the fact that many
other types of situations might arise which could further complicate such
matters, it would appear that the need for new comprehensive federal legisla-
tion in this area cannot be overstated. Medical technology has reaclied the
point where we can no longer disregard the status of the embryo in these
situations, especially in light of the fact that it is now possible for the embryo
to be right there before our eyes in a cryopreserved state, and that present
law is inadequate to cover the illogical distinctions raised by these new
possibilities.
B. State Law
1. The Ability of the Fetus to Sue
A very significant line of authority has developed in the state courts which
accords the unborn fetus certain rights of action for prenatal injuries sus-
tained if subsequently born alive.98 While the earlier cases proposed a viabil-
97. According to the Secretary, it should be noted that "the Department has extended the
meaning of the term 'fetus' to include the fetus ex utero until such time as such fetus is deter-
mined to be viable. The effect of this change is to delete the term 'abortus' which appeared in
the proposed rulemaking, and refer instead to a fetus ex utero." 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526 (1975).
As medical technology pushes back the time from birth when the fetus is "viable," the distinc-
tion drawn between the implanted-subsequently ex utero fetus and unimplanted-developing
embryo with respect to the regulations becomes less justifiable.
98. The most important early case was Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946),
a malpractice action for injuries sustained to the fetus during childbirth. Relevant to the no-
tion of rights of the fetus, the court reasoned that "while dependent for its continued develop-
ment or sustenance derived from its mother, (the viable fetus) is not a 'part' of the mother in
the sense of a constituent element-as that term is generally understood. Modem medicine is
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ity requirement as the definitive point where separability occurred, enabling
the child to sue for his injuries,99 the modem trend is to allow a cause of
action on behalf of the fetus for any post-conception injuries."°° The early
case of Kelley v. Gregory 1' established the non-viability standard subse-
quently followed by other courts. In a decision which contained prophetic
language as to the nature of the effect of advancing medical technology in
this area of the law, the Kelley court stated:
102
While the point at which the fetus becomes viable has been of use-
fulness in drawing some legal distinctions, the underlying problem
that has usually troubled the judges who have written on the sub-
ject of recovery for pre-natal injuries, has been in fixing the point of
legal separability from the mother . . . . We know something
more of the actual process of conception and fetal development
now than when some of the common law cases were decided; and
what we know makes it possible to demonstrate clearly that sepa-
rability begins at conception.
Another recent line of authority has created a cause of action under the
wrongful death statutes of the various states on behalf of the estate of a
stillborn fetus.' The majority view here is that recovery will be permitted
only in the case of injury and stillbirth of a viable fetus, though at least two
courts would allow a wrongful death recovery for previable injury to a still-
born fetus."° The first state to allow such recovery was Minnesota, in the
case of Verkennes v. Corniea, "o5 in which the court held "where independent
existence is possible and the life is destroyed through a wrongful act a cause
of action arises." 1o6
A more recent case which prospectively allowed recovery for the death of
replete with cases of living children being taken from dead mothers." Id. at 140. This ration-
ale was based upon the legal premise that a viable fetus was an independent legal person and
was owed a separate duty of care from that of its mother.
99. See id.; Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962).
100. See Wolfe v. Isabell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973); Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn.
Supp. 139, 380 A.2d 1353 (1977); Renglow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E. 2d
1250 (1977); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967). These decisions require that the
child be born alive in order to successfully recover on his behalf.
101. 282 A.D.2d 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
102. Id. at 543, 125 N.Y.2d at 697. See also Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Ak-
ron, 426 U.S. at 452.
103. See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R. 3d 411, 422-25 (1978).
104. See Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976) (dictum); Porter v.
Lassiter, 91 Ga.App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
105. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
106. Id. at 370, 38 N.W.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
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a viable fetus for motor vehicle homicide is Commonwealth v. Cass.'07 The
court noted that in enacting the statute, it was reasonable to assume the
legislature contemplated that the term "person" would be construed to in-
clude viable fetuses, 10 8 and even if it did not so contemplate, it was nonethe-
less proper for the court to "define the term person by reference to
established and developing common law.
'' 9
Another basis for the decision was that medical science is now able to
provide competent proof as to whether the fetus was alive at the time of the
defendant's conduct and whether the conduct was the cause of death." 0 In
light of this knowledge, and "because we have long since concluded that fear
of speculation is not a sufficient ground for denying a civil right of action for
prenatal injuries. . . [w]e do not consider it a significant reason for refusing
to consider the killing of a fetus a homicide." ''
These cases represent instances in which the courts have said that the fe-
tus is a "person" or has certain rights for the purposes of the statute being
construed. The next inquiry, then, is to determine at what point the fetus
becomes a person under that particular statute. After this question is raised
and, one hopes, answered, it must then be asked on what basis do we justify
the distinctions which inevitably are drawn.
Thus, while the courts have taken a hodgepodge approach to answering or
attempting to answer some of these questions, advancing medical technology
has at least been partially responsible for the questions being raised in the
first place. It is reasonable to assume that the status of the early embryo,
either implanted or unimplanted, will soon be brought into the discussion as
the courts continue to take cognizance of what medical knowledge has
forced upon them.
107. 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984). The court ruled that the decision would not
be applied to defendant Cass, whose car struck a woman who was 8 months pregnant. The
fetus died in the womb as a result of the injuries. The court noted lack of foreseeability of its
decision as the reason why prospectivity was applied.
108. Id. at 802, 467 N.E.2d at 1326.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 805, 467 N.E.2d at 1328.
111. Id. at 806, 467 N.E.2d at 1328-29. In a footnote, the court recognized the constitu-
tional limits imposed by such cases as Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81-84 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 165-66 (1973). This raises an interesting question addressed earlier, i.e., when the rights
of the fetus are weighed against the mother's right to privacy. The due process dilemma inher-
ent in this context is particularly perplexing because a value judgment must inevitably be made
with respect to whose rights should prevail.
Three justices dissented on the ground that "the question whether the killing of a viable
fetus by reason of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle should be a separate crime is for
the Legislature as a matter of wise social policy, and a strong case can be made for appropriate
legislation to that effect." Id. at 1330.
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2. Relevant IVF and Fetal Experimentation Law
Although federal law exists in the area of fetal research and IVF, the regu-
lations were not intended to be preemptive of state law in these areas.' 2
Thus, a number of states have subsequently enacted legislation designed to
restrict fetal research," 3 but only Illinois has explicitly regulated in vitro
fertilization or embryo transfer." 4 As opposed to the federal regulations," 5
many of the state laws do not exempt unimplanted embryos from fetal re-
search regulation, either because they intend to protect all life from the mo-
ment of conception or because they are imprecise in their definitions of
"fetus." 116
The most significant of these laws for the purposes of protecting the unim-
planted embryo is the Illinois statute regulating IVF. The statute provides
that anyone causing the production of an embryo ex utero will be regarded
as having the care and custody of a child.'" The constitutionality of this
statute was unsuccessfully challenged by a married couple and their physi-
cian, who claimed the law was unconstitutionally vague and prevented them
from using the IVF technique, thereby violating their constitutional right of
privacy.' The State's argument was that the statute merely placed the em-
bryo in the custody and care of the physician during the pre-implantation
phase and only required that he refrain from willfully endangering or injur-
ing the conceptus.' The court dismissed the case on the ground that no
case or controversy was raised since the statute did not prevent the couple
from participating in the IVF procedure.120 The court explicitly recognized
that a factual setting where excess embryos not suitable for transfer existed
may have prompted the court to address the more precise issue of the possi-
112. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(b) (1983).
113. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 54-55.
114. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd 1982).
115. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d) (1983).
116. See Blumberg, supra note 88, at 1178.
117. The Illinois statute, supra note 114, provides:
Any person who intentionally causes the fertilization of a human ovum by a human
sperm outside the body of a living human female shall, with regard to the human
being thereby produced, be deemed to have care and custody of a child for the pur-
poses of Section 4 of the Act to Prevent and Punish Wrongs to Children, approved
May 17, 1877, as amended, (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2354 (1981)) except that
nothing in that Section shall be construed to attach any penalty to participation in
the performance of a lawful pregnancy termination.
The last clause of this statute is one way in which the clashing constitutional due process and
privacy rights discussed earlier might be addressed or even avoided.
118. Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
119. Id at 161.
120. Id. at 162.
Cryopreservation
ble constitutional rights of the unimplanted embryo. 2 '
Another important regulation is the Minnesota statute122 which provides
protection for a living human conceptus, conceived either in or ex utero,
from any type of scientific, laboratory research or experimentation except to
protect the life or health of the conceptus. While the narrow issue under this
statute would be whether transfer is appropriate insofar as the act of trans-
ferring itself may be a type of prohibited experimentation, the broader ques-
tion of the legal status of the unimplanted embryo is clearly contemplated to
some extent, as evidenced by the plain language of the regulation.
While these two statutes recognize some type of rights possessed by the
unimplanted embryo, it is nonetheless difficult to discern precisely what they
are. Thus, the same problem exists here as in the federal regulations, and it
is apparent that uniform regulation, explicitly avoided in the federal statutes,
is perhaps the best solution to the highly sensitive area of fetal research and
experimentation.
CONCLUSION
As medical technology pushes back the point at which a fetus is viable,
and as the effort continues for federal life-protective legislation for the un-
born at the moment of conception, the distinctions which have been created
both legislatively and judicially concerning fetal and embryo rights become,
legally and philosophically, more and more illogical. When one is dealing
with a question so basic as "what is life," it seems rather absurd that our
legal system tolerates inferior legislative bodies and courts arbitrarily setting
the point at different stages for different purposes. From a moral or legal
standpoint, one does not become a "person" simply because he crosses a
state line and happens to be injured and die there; nor does an embryo be-
come a "child" only when he is unimplanted and in the care and custody of
a physician; nor should a legal system be allowed to construe or embrace
policies which facially, as well as upon deep and careful analysis, appear to
be so ill-advised. The status of the early embryo as "orphaned," "unim-
planted," or "implanted" is simply not relevant to the important issue of its
intrinsic worth as a human entity, and this issue certainly is or should be the
central focus of inquiry.
Thus the need for comprehensive federal legislation in this area is clear.
Though some might argue that this type of legislation would seriously erode
the federal system our Founders so carefully erected, it is important to re-
member that this particular area of the law is the most fundamental and
121. Id. at 163, 164.
122. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.421 (West Supp. 1982).
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basic to our democratic society, going directly to the heart of liberty itself.
Our Constitution protects the due process right to life, liberty, and property,
and the time has come to recognize this right in all human life, particularly
the innocent unborn who cannot be heard themselves.
Bart Van de Weghe
